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ABSTRACT
Digital signatures are perhaps the most important base
for authentication and trust relationships in large scale
systems. More specifically, various applications of signa-
tures provide privacy and anonymity preserving mech-
anisms and protocols, and these, in turn, are becoming
critical (due to the recently recognized need to protect in-
dividuals according to national rules and regulations). A
specific type of signatures called“signatures with efficient
protocols”, as introduced by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya
(CL), efficiently accommodates various basic protocols
and extensions like zero-knowledge proofs, signing com-
mitted messages, or re-randomizability. These are, in
fact, typical operations associated with signatures used
in typical anonymity and privacy-preserving scenarios.
To date there are no “signatures with efficient protocols”
which are based on simple assumptions and truly prac-
tical. These two properties assure us a robust primi-
tive: First, simple assumptions are needed for ensur-
ing that this basic primitive is mathematically robust
and does not require special ad hoc assumptions that
are more risky, imply less efficiency, are more tuned to
the protocol itself, and are perhaps less trusted. In the
other dimension, efficiency is a must given the anonymity
applications of the protocol, since without proper level
of efficiency the future adoption of the primitives is al-
ways questionable (in spite of their need). In this work,
we present a new CL-type signature scheme that is re-
randomizable under a simple, well-studied, and by now
standard, assumption (SXDH). The signature is efficient
(built on the recent QA-NIZK constructions), and is, by
design, suitable to work in extended contexts that typify
privacy settings (like anonymous credentials, group sig-
nature, and oﬄine e-cash). We demonstrate its power by
presenting practical protocols based on it.
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†Work done while in Google
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1. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures are one of the fundamental crypto-
graphic building blocks used in countless applications.
The design of privacy-preserving protocols often requires
signature schemes that are compatible with other primi-
tives, primarily zero-knowledge proofs. Namely, it should
be possible to sign messages without affecting their al-
gebraic structure (in particular, without hashing them),
in a way that maintains a signature holder’s capability
of efficiently proving statements about hidden message-
signature pairs. Primitives like “structure-preserving sig-
natures” [1, 39] or “signatures with efficient protocols”
[18] were designed exactly in this spirit. While the for-
mer are motivated by security proofs in the standard
model via the Groth-Sahai proof systems [32], the latter
aim at enabling truly practical schemes.
Signature schemes with efficient protocols by Ca-
menisch and Lysyanskaya [18] typically extend the func-
tionalities of ordinary digital signatures in two ways: (i)
They provide a protocol whereby a signer can obliviously
sign a committed message known only to the user; (ii)
Users should be able to efficiently prove possession of a
hidden message-signature pair in a zero-knowledge man-
ner. The latter property has proved extremely useful in
the design of many efficient anonymity-related protocols
such as anonymous credentials [21, 17], compact e-cash
[16], revocable group signatures [43], oblivious transfer
with access control [15] or certified private set intersec-
tion protocols [20].
The quality of a signature scheme is measured in two
dimensions (and interactions thereof): first, the simplic-
ity of the cryptographic assumption on which it is based,
and secondly, its computational efficiency. So far, regard-
ing cryptographic assumptions, most signature schemes
with efficient protocols either require groups of hidden
order [18] – where elements need a longer representation
to keep the group order hidden – or they rely on non-
standard hardness assumptions [19, 4, 45] in groups with
a bilinear maps (or both since the Strong RSA assump-
tion [5], which [18] relies on, is usually not recognized
as standard). Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CL) [19]
showed how to adapt their Strong-RSA-based scheme in
pairing-friendly groups. Their scheme, however, relies
on the interactive LRSW assumption [42]. Moreover, as
pointed out in [46], it requires O(n) group elements to
sign messages made of ` blocks. Pointcheval and Sanders
[46] recently modified CL signatures to sign `-block mes-
sages using O(1) group elements, but their scheme is only
proven secure in the generic group model. While the
first CL signature [18] has a natural counterpart [4, 45]
based on a non-interactive assumption, it still requires a
non-standard“q-type”assumption [13] where the number
of input elements depends on the number of adversarial
queries. We note that here we call all the above assump-
tions “non standard” (whether they are employed in the
regular or random oracle models). For the time being,
we are only aware of two schemes based on fixed-size as-
sumptions. The first one is a variant, due to Gerbush
et al. [33], of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [19] in
composite order groups. Due to its much larger group or-
der, it is inherently much less efficient than solutions in
prime-order groups: for equivalent security levels, Free-
man estimates [29] that computing a pairing over groups
of order N = pq is at least 50 times slower than the same
pairing in the prime order setting. The second construc-
tion is a scheme, proposed by Yuen et al. [49] under the
Decision Linear assumption [14]. Unfortunately, unlike
LRSW-based Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [19], it
is deficient as it does not provide “randomizable signa-
tures,” an important property which – in the context of
group signatures, for instance – enables re-randomization
of credentials across distinct privacy-preserving authen-
tications, and allows for a better efficiency.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose a
new signature scheme with efficient protocols and re-
randomizable signatures under simple, well-studied as-
sumptions. The security of our scheme is proved
in the standard model under the Symmetric eXternal
Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption, which is a well-
established, constant-size assumption (i.e., described us-
ing a constant number of elements, regardless of the num-
ber of adversarial queries) in groups with a bilinear map.
Remarkably, we can sign `-block messages using only 4
group elements under the SXDH assumption.
Our signature length is enabled by the use of efficient
Quasi-Adaptive Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (QA-
NIZK) arguments for linear subspaces. As introduced
by Jutla and Roy [34], QA-NIZK arguments are com-
putationally sound proofs where the common reference
string (CRS) may depend on the language of which mem-
bership must be proved. It was shown [40, 35, 38] that,
for the task of arguing that a vector of group elements
belongs to some linear subspace, the size of arguments
may be independent of the dimensions of the considered
subspace. Our signature scheme crucially exploits this
observation as `-block messages are signed by generating
a QA-NIZK argument for a subspace of dimension O(`).
Our signature natively supports efficient privacy-
enhancing protocols. We describe a two-party proto-
col allowing a user to obtain a signature on a commit-
ted multi-block message as well as a honest-verifier zero-
knowledge protocol for efficiently demonstrating knowl-
edge of a signature on a committed message revealing nei-
ther the message nor the signature. Hence, our scheme
readily enables the design of an efficient anonymous cre-
dentials system based on the sole SXDH assumption.
As another application of our signature scheme, we
describe a truly practical group signature (for dynamic
groups) based on simple assumptions in the random or-
acle model. Our scheme is competitive with the best
solutions [14, 27] based on non-interactive assumptions
(which are those relying on the Strong Diffie-Hellman
assumption [13]) in terms of computational cost and
signature length. Concretely, at the 128-bit security
level, each signature fits within 320 bytes while providing
anonymity in the strongest sense (i.e., against adversaries
equipped with a signature opening oracle). To the best of
our knowledge, the new scheme thus features the short-
est group signatures based on standard assumptions.
It seems that our signature scheme has many other
potential applications. For example, combining it with
the ideas of [16] and a pseudo-random function based on
standard assumptions (e.g., [44]) readily gives a compact
e-cash system based on simple hardness assumptions.
Related Work. Anonymous credentials were intro-
duced by Chaum [21] and efficiently designed by Ca-
menisch and Lysyanskaya [17, 18]. They involve creden-
tial issuers and users who have a long-term secret key
and pseudonyms which can be seen as commitments to
their secret key. Users can obtain credentials from an is-
suer which only knows their pseudonym and obliviously
certifies their secret key along with (optionally) a set
of associated attributes. Users can subsequently interact
with service providers – who know them under a different
pseudonym – and demonstrate possession of the issuer’s
signature on their secret key without leaking anything
else. Anonymous credentials involve a protocol allowing
the user to obtain the issuer’s signature on a committed
message, a protocol for proving that two commitments
open to the same message and a protocol for proving pos-
session of a signature on a committed message.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya gave the first efficient so-
lutions based the Strong RSA assumption [17, 18]. Vari-
ants based on bilinear maps were considered in, e.g., [19,
2]. In the non-interactive setting (i.e., without interac-
tive conversations between provers and verifiers) solu-
tions in the standard model were given in [7, 6]. As a
matter of fact, all truly practical solutions [18, 19, 2] re-
quire non-standard ad hoc assumptions.
Group signatures are a central privacy primitive,
coined by Chaum and van Heyst [22], where members of
a group managed by some authority can sign messages
messages in the name of the group. Group member’s
accountability is enforced by means of an opening au-
thority that can identify misbehaving signers. Ateniese,
Camenisch, Joye and Tsudik [3] provided the first vi-
able solution meeting the natural security requirements
of the primitive, although rigorous security definitions
were not available yet. These appeared later on in the
work of Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [9], which [36,
11] subsequently extended to the dynamic setting. In
these models, efficient schemes have been put forth in
the random oracle model [36, 27] and the standard model
[31]. As of now, however, a truly practical solution based
on constant-size assumptions in the random oracle model
remains lacking.
2. BACKGROUND
Notations. We let G, Gˆ,GT denote groups of prime
order p ≥ 2λ where λ ∈ N is the security parameter.
Bold capital letters will denote matrices, like M, and
bold lowercase letters stand for vectors, like v. Finally
PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time.
2.1 Hardness Assumptions
We use bilinear maps e : G × Gˆ → GT over groups of
prime order p where e(g, hˆ) 6= 1GT iff g 6= 1G and hˆ 6= 1Gˆ.
We rely on hardness assumptions that are non-interactive
and described using a constant number of elements.
Definition 1. The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
problem in G, is to distinguish the distributions
(ga, gb, gab) and (ga, gb, gc), with a, b, c R← Zp. The DDH
assumption is the intractability of the problem for any
PPT distinguisher.
The SXDH assumption posits the hardness of DDH in G
and Gˆ, when G 6= Gˆ.
We also rely on the following problem, which generalizes
the Discrete Logarithm problem to asymmetric pairings.
Definition 2. In bilinear groups (G, Gˆ,GT ) of prime
order p, the Symmetric Discrete Logarithm (SDL)
problem consists in, given (g, gˆ, ga, gˆa) ∈ G × Gˆ where
a R← Zp, computing a ∈ Zp.
2.2 Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Arguments for
Linear Subspaces
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK) proofs [34] are
NIZK proofs where the common reference string (CRS)
may depend on the language for which proofs have to be
generated. Formal definitions are given in [34, 40, 38].
This section recalls the QA-NIZK argument of [38] for
proving membership in the row space of a matrix. In the
description below, we assume that all algorithms take as
input the description of common public parameters cp
consisting of asymmetric bilinear groups (G, Gˆ,GT , p) of
prime order p > 2λ, where λ is the security parameter.
In this setting the problem is to convince that v is a lin-
ear combination of the rows of a given M ∈ Gt×n.
Kiltz and Wee [38] suggested the following construction
which simplifies [40] and remains secure under SXDH.
We stress that cp is independent of M = ( ~M1 · · · ~Mt)T .
Keygen(cp,M): Given public parameters cp =
(G, Gˆ,GT , p) and the matrix M = (Mi,j) ∈ Gt×n.
Then, choose gˆz
R← Gˆ. Pick tk = (χ1, . . . , χn) R←
Znp and compute gˆj = gˆzχj , for all j = 1 to n.
Then, for i = 1 to t, compute zi =
∏n
j=1 M
−χj
i,j and
output crs =
({zi}ti=1, gˆz, {gˆj}nj=1) ∈ Gt × Gˆn+1.
Prove(crs, v, {ωi}ti=1): To prove that v =
~Mω11 · · · ~Mωtt , for some witness ω1, . . . , ωt ∈ Zp,
parse crs as above and return pi =
∏t
i=1 z
ωi
i .
Sim(tk, v): In order to simulate a proof for a vector v ∈
Gn using tk = {χi}ni=1, output pi =
∏n
j=1 v
−χj
j .
Verify(crs, v, pi): Given pi ∈ G and v = (v1, . . . , vn), re-
turn 1 if and only if (v1, . . . , vn) 6= (1G, . . . , 1G) and
pi satisfies 1GT = e(pi, gˆz) ·
∏n
j=1 e(vj , gˆj).
The proof of the soundness of this QA-NIZK argument
system requires the matrix M to be witness-samplable.
This means that the reduction has to know the discrete
logarithms of the group elements of M. This requirement
is compatible with our security proofs.
3. A RANDOMIZABLE SIGNATURE ON
MULTI-BLOCKMESSAGES
In [41], Libert et al. described an F-unforgeable sig-
nature based on the SXDH assumption. We show that
their scheme implies an efficient ordinary digital signa-
ture which makes it possible to efficiently sign multi-
block messages in Z`p while keeping the scheme compat-
ible with efficient protocols. In order to keep the sig-
nature length independent of the number of blocks, we
exploit the property that the underlying QA-NIZK argu-
ment [38] has constant size, regardless of the dimensions
of the considered linear subspace. Moreover, we show
that their scheme remains unforgeable under the SXDH
assumption.
Keygen(λ, `) : Choose bilinear groups cp = (G, Gˆ,GT , p)
of prime order p > 2λ with g R← G, gˆ R← Gˆ.
1. Choose ω, a R← Zp, and set h = ga, Ω = hω.
2. Choose ~v = (v1, . . . , v`, w)
R← G`+1.
3. Define a matrix M = (Mj,i)j,i ∈ G(`+2)×(2`+4)
M =
(
g 1`+1 1`+1 h
~v> gI`+1 hI`+1 1>
`+1
)
, (1)
where 1`+1 = (1G, . . . , 1G) ∈ G`+1.
4. Run Keygen(cp,M) of the QA-NIZK argument of
Section 2.2 to get crs = ({zi}`+2i=1 , gˆz, {gˆj}2`+4j=1 ).
The private key is sk := ω and the public key is
pk =
(
cp, g, h, gˆ, ~v, Ω = hω, crs
)
.
Sign(sk, ~m = (m1, . . . ,m`)) : given the private key sk =
ω and a message ~m ∈ Z`p, choose s R← Zp to com-
pute
σ1 = g
ω · (vm11 · · · vm`` · w)s, σ2 = gs, σ3 = hs.
Then, run Prove of the QA-NIZK argument to
prove that the following vector of G2`+4
(σ1, σ
m1
2 , . . . , σ
m`
2 , σ2, σ
m1
3 , . . . , σ
m`
3 , σ3,Ω) (2)
is in the row space of M. This QA-NIZK proof
pi ∈ G consists of pi = zω1 · (zm12 · · · zm``+1 · z`+2)s.
Return the signature σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3, pi
) ∈ G4.
Verify(pk, σ, ~m) : parse σ as above and ~m as a tuple
(m1, . . . ,m`) in Z`p and return 1 if and only if
e(Ω, gˆ2`+4)
−1 = e(pi, gˆz) · e(σ1, gˆ1) (3)
· e(σ2, gˆm12 · · · gˆm``+1 · gˆ`+2)
· e(σ3, gˆm1`+3 · · · gˆm`2`+2 · gˆ2`+3).
The signature on ` scalars thus only consists of 4 ele-
ments in G while the verification equation only involves
a computation of 5 pairings.
Theorem 1. The above signature scheme is existen-
tially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks (eu-cma)
if the SXDH assumption holds in (G, Gˆ,GT ). (The proof
is available in Appendix A.)
4. COMPANION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we give Σ protocols for issuing a signa-
ture on a committed multi-block message and for proving
knowledge of a valid message-signature pair.
4.1 Σ-Protocols
As defined by Cramer [23], Σ protocols are three-move
honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocols where the first
and last messages are sent by the prover.
Definition 3. [23] A Σ protocol for an NP language L :
{s | ∃w : L(s, w) = 1} is a pair of interactive algorithms
(P, V ) that work as follows. On input (s, w) for P and s
for V , the following interaction takes place:
1. P outputs a “commitment” com to the verifier.
2. V selects a “challenge” chall uniformly at random
from a challenge space and sends it to the prover.
3. P sends a “response” resp and halts.
Eventually, V evaluates a predicate Verify on the state-
ment s and the transcript (com, chall, resp) and returns 0
or 1, then halts.
Beyond the completeness requirement (i.e., an honest
run between P (s, w) and V (s) always accepts if L(s, w) =
1), the following security properties should be satisfied:
Special soundness A matching pair of tran-
scripts w.r.t. a statement s is a pair
trans1 = (com1; chall1; resp1) and trans2 =
(com2; chall2; resp2) which are both accepting
conversations, com1 = com2 but chall1 6= chall2.
A Σ protocol has special soundness if there is an
extractor Extract that takes as input a statement s
and a matching pair of transcripts (trans1; trans2)
and returns a witness w such that L(s;w) = 1.
Special honest verifier ZK A Σ protocol has spe-
cial honest verifier zero knowledge (SHVZK) if
there is a simulator Sim that takes as input a
statement s (that may or may not be valid)
and a challenge chall and outputs a transcript
(com; chall; resp) using the challenge provided such
that Verify(s; (com; chall; resp)) = 1. Furthermore,
transcripts produced by the simulator for correct
statements s are indistinguishable from transcripts
produced by P and V on input s, where P addi-
tionally has any witness w for s as input.
Several techniques [26, 30] are known to transform
Σ protocols (SHVZK) into interactive zero-knowledge
proofs which remain secure against malicious verifiers.
4.2 Proof of Knowledge of a Signature on a
Committed Message
We give Σ protocols for proving the knowledge of a
signature-message pair (σ, ~m) satisfying the verification
equation of the scheme of Section 3
e(Ω, gˆ2`+4)
−1 = e(σ1, gˆ1) · e(σ2, gˆm12 · · · gˆm``+1 · gˆ`+2) (4)
· e(σ3, gˆm1`+3 · · · gˆm`2`+2 · gˆ2`+3) · e(pi, gˆz),
where σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, pi) and ~m = (m1, . . . ,m`). We
note that, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, a candi-
date signature (σ1, σ2, σ3, pi) may satisfy the verification
equation although logg(σ2) 6= logh(σ3). In applications
to anonymous credentials, a malicious credential issuer
could take advantage of this fact in attempts to break
the anonymity of the scheme (e.g., by linking two au-
thentications involving the same credential). For this
reason, we consider a protocol for proving possession of
a possibly maliciously generated signature.
We thus consider the case of arbitrary valid signatures
that may have been maliciously computed by a signer
who, e.g., aims at tracing provers across different au-
thentications. In this setting, we can still obtain a per-
fect SHVZK Σ protocol to hedge against such attacks.
A first attempt to efficiently build such a protocol
is to “linearize” the verification equation (4) by mak-
ing sure that two witnesses are never paired together.
However, we will still have to deal with (paralleliz-
able) intermediate Σ protocols for quadratic scalar rela-
tions. Even though a quadratic pairing-product equation
e(x1, aˆ) · e(x2, yˆ) – for variables x1, x2, yˆ and constant aˆ
– can be linearized by partially randomizing the vari-
ables so as to get the equation e(x1 · xr2, aˆ) · e(x2, yˆ · aˆ−r)
(which allows yˆ′ = yˆ · aˆ−r to appear in the clear), prov-
ing knowledge of a valid signature still requires proving
a statement about some representation of yˆ which now
appears in committed form. Somehow, going through
the randomizing factor aˆ−r involves a quadratic relation
between some known exponents to get special-soundness.
To ease the entire proof we rather directly commit to the
variables in G and Gˆ using their available generator g and
gˆ which are not among the constants of the verification
equation of the signature. We additionally need an extra
generator f of G whose discrete logarithm is unknown.
Commit Given (σ, ~m), conduct the following steps.
1. Commit to d1 := gˆ
m1
2 · · · gˆm``+1 · gˆ`+2 ∈ Gˆ and
d2 := gˆ
m1
`+3 · · · gˆm`2`+2 · gˆ2`+3 ∈ Gˆ. To this end,
choose r1, r2
R← Zp and compute Dˆ1 = d1 · gˆr1 and
Dˆ2 = d2 · gˆr2 .
2. In order to prove knowledge of an opening of com-
mitments Dˆ1, Dˆ2 ∈ Gˆ to the same message ~m =
(m1, . . . ,m`) ∈ Z`p, choose s1, s2, u1, . . . , u` R← Zp
and compute Eˆ1 = gˆ
u1
2 · · · gˆu``+1 · gˆs1 and Eˆ2 =
gˆu1`+3 · · · gˆu`2`+2 · gˆs2 .
3. Using r1, r2 ∈ Zp from step 1, define σ0 = σr12 ·
σr23 and commit to (pi, σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ G5. For this
purpose, choose tz, t0, t1, t2, t3
R← Zp at random and
set Cz = pi · gtz , Ci = σi · gti , for i ∈ {0, . . . , 3},
and Dˆ0 = gˆ
tz
z · gˆt11 · Dˆt21 · Dˆt32 · gˆ−t0 .
4. In order to prove (partial) knowledge of an opening
to (Cz, C0, C1, C2, C3, Dˆ0), compute Eˆ0 = gˆ
vz
z · gˆv11 ·
Dˆv21 · Dˆv32 · gˆ−v0 for random vz, v0, v1, v2, v3 R← Zp.
5. Prove that C0 is well-formed relatively to the com-
mitted values in C1, C2 and the coins r1, r2 ∈ Zp
used in Dˆ1, Dˆ2. To this end, prove knowledge
of the representation C0 = C
r1
2 · Cr23 · gt4 , where
t4 = t0 − r1 · t2 − r2 · t3. To do this, compute
F0 = C
s1
2 · Cs23 · gv4 , for v4 R← Zp and where
s1, s2 ∈ Zp are the random coins used in Eˆ1, Eˆ2.
6. To prove that t4 = t0 − r1 · t2 − r2 · t3, (re-)commit
to t0, t2, t3, t4 ∈ Zp by picking x2, x3, x4 R← Zp and
computing
Ti = g
ti · fxi ∀i ∈ {0, 2, 3, 4},
where x0 = x2 · r1 + x3 · r2 + x4. Ensure that
committed variables coincide with those of previous
steps by computing
{Vi = gvi · fyi}i∈{0,2,3,4},
where y0, y2, y3, y4
R← Zp. To prove the equality
T0 = T
r1
2 · T r23 · T4, re-use s1, s2 ∈ Zp from steps 2
and 5 to compute S0 = T
s1
2 · T s23 .
Finally, keep Cz ∈ G and all the random coins in aux,
and output
com =
(
{Ci}3i=0, F0, {(Ti, Vi)}i=0,2,3,4,
S0, {(Dˆi, Eˆi)}2i=0
)
∈ G14 × Gˆ6
(5)
Challenge Given com as per (5), pick ρ R← Zp uniformly
at random and return chall = ρ.
Response On inputs com, aux and chall = ρ, compute:
1. m¯i = ρ ·mi +ui, for i = 1 to `, r¯1 = ρ · r1 + s1, and
r¯2 = ρ · r2 + s2;
2. wz = ρ · tz + vz and wi = ρ · ti + vi, for i = 0 to 3;
3. w4 = ρ · t4 + v4, where t4 := t0 − t1 · r1 − t2 · r2;
4. zi = ρ · xi + yi for each i ∈ {0, 2, 3, 4}.
Output resp ∈ G× Z`+12p as(
Cz, {m¯i}`i=1, r¯1, r¯2, wz, {wi}4i=0, {zi}i=0,2,3,4
)
.
Verify Given (com; chall; resp) return 0 if it does not
parse correctly or if the following relations do not
hold:
1. (Dˆ1/gˆ`+2)
ρ · Eˆ1 = gˆ m¯12 · · · gˆ m¯``+1 · gr¯1 and
(Dˆ2/gˆ2`+3)
ρ · Eˆ2 = gˆ m¯1`+3 · · · gˆ m¯`2`+2 · gr¯2 ;
2. Dˆ ρ0 · Eˆ0 = gˆwzz · gˆw11 · Dˆw21 · Dˆw32 · gˆ−w0 and C ρ0 ·F0 =
C r¯12 · C r¯23 · gw4 .
3. T ρi · Vi = gwifzi for each i ∈ {0, 2, 3, 4} and
(T0/T4)
ρ · S0 = T r¯12 · T r¯23 . (6)
Then, return 1 if and only if
e(C0, gˆ) · e(g, Dˆ0) · e(Ω, gˆ2`+4)−1 (7)
= e(C1, gˆ1) · e(C2, Dˆ1) · e(C3, Dˆ2) · e(Cz, gˆz).
It is worth noticing that no pairing evaluation is required
until the final step of Verify, which is almost as efficient
as the verification of underlying signatures. Moreover,
the prover’s first message com is of constant-size and the
communication complexity of the protocol exceeds the
length of the witness by a constant additive overhead.
Theorem 2. The above interactive scheme is a secure
Σ protocol for the language Lsig induced by the relation
Rsig(pk, (~σ, ~m)) = 1 if and only if Verify
′(pk, ~σ, ~m) = 1,
where (KeyGen, Sign,Verify′) is the signature of Section 3.
Proof. Correctness. Expanding an honestly gener-
ated Dˆ0 = gˆ
tz
z · gˆt11 · Dˆt21 · Dˆt32 · gˆ−t0 in equation (7) and
regrouping the pairing factors gives
e(C0 · g−t0 , gˆ) · e(Ω, gˆ2`+4)−1
= e(C1 · g−t1 , gˆ1) · e(C2 · g−t2 , Dˆ1)
· e(C3 · g−t3 , Dˆ2) · e(Cz · g−tz , gˆz).
Now, expanding the commitments to group elements in
G reduces this equation to
e(σr12 · σr23 , gˆ) · e(Ω, gˆ2`+4)−1
= e(σ1, gˆ1) · e(σ2, Dˆ1) · e(σ3, Dˆ2) · e(pi, gˆz)
which holds true for valid witnesses when Dˆ1 = d1 · gˆr1
and Dˆ2 = d2 · gˆr2 . Remaining verifications of items 1,2,3
follow from the correctness of the built-in Σ protocols.
Special-Soundness. Let us assume two accepting tran-
scripts (com, ρ, resp), (com, ρ′, resp′) with ρ 6= ρ′. The
special soundness of the sub-protocols involving Dˆ1, Dˆ2
(with Eˆ1, Eˆ2) – consisting of steps 1 and 2 of Com-
mit and step 1 of Verify – ensures the extraction of
m1, . . . ,m`, r1, r2 satisfying Dˆ1 = d1 · gˆr1 , where d1 =
gˆm12 · · · gˆm``+1 · gˆ`+2, and Dˆ2 = d2 · gˆr2 , where d2 =
gˆm1`+3 · · · gˆm`2`+2 · gˆ2`+3. From step 2 of Verify, a similar
argument on Dˆ0 (with Eˆ0) implies the extractability of
(tz, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4) such that Dˆ0 = gˆ
tz
z ·gˆt11 ·Dˆt21 ·Dˆt32 ·gˆ−t0 .
Moreover, together with previously extracted (r1, r2),
step 2 of Verify also guarantees that t4 satisfies C0 =
Cr12 · Cr23 · gt4 .
We now state that quantities {σi = Ci · g−ti}i∈{1,2,3}
and pi = Cz · g−tz satisfy (3), so that, together with
~m = (m1, . . . ,m`), they form a valid witness for Rsig.
Namely, (σ, ~m) = ((σ1, σ2, σ3, pi), (m1, . . . ,m`)) is a valid
message-signature pair.
To see this, define σ0 = C0 · g−t0 . Since equation (7)
holds by hypothesis, if we expand all commitments using
extracted values, we find
e(σ0, gˆ) · e(Ω, gˆ2`+4)−1
= e(σ1, gˆ1) · e(σ2, d1 · gˆr1) · e(σ3, d2 · gˆr2) · e(pi, gˆz).
We are thus left with showing that σ0 = σ
r1
2 · σr23
or, equivalently, e(σ0, gˆ) = e(σ2, gˆ
r1) · e(σ3, gˆr2). Re-
member that, from step 2 of Verify, we know that ex-
tracted (r1, r2, t4) ∈ Z3p form a representation of C0
w.r.t. the base (C0, C2, g): i.e., C0 = C
r1
2 · Cr23 · gt4 ,
which, from the definition of σ0, σ2, σ3, yields σ0 · gt0 =
σr12 · σr23 · gt2·r1+t3·r2+t4 . Hence, we are done if we can
show that t0 = t2r1 + t3r2 + t4. But this exactly what
step 3 of Verify and the special soundness of the sub-
protocol involving (T0, T2, T3, T4) tells us. First, we have
a representation of these Ti’s w.r.t. the basis (g, f) ∈ G2
which guarantees that we are working on the already ex-
tracted (t0, t2, t3, t4) involved in the expressions of Dˆ0
and C0. Second, the verification equation (6) ensures
that T0 = T
r1
2 · T r23 · T4 and the final result follows by
replacing them by their representation.
Perfect SHVZK. To show this property we must build a
simulator that, on input of a challenge chall = ρ ∈R Zp,
emulates a valid transcript without any witness. First,
we need to compute a random tuple Cz, {Ci}3i=0, {Dˆ}2i=0
constrained to satisfy the verification equation (7).
From the identity e(Ω, gˆ2`+4)
−1 = e(Ω−1, gˆ2`+4) we
first pick a0, a1, a2, az ← Zp, Dˆ1 ← Gˆ and we have
e(Ω, gˆ2`+4)
−1 = e(Ω−1, gˆ2`+4 · gˆa0 gˆa11 Dˆa21 gˆazz ) · e(Ωa0 , gˆ) ·
e(Ωa1 , gˆ1) · e(Ωa2 , Dˆ1) · e(Ωaz , gˆz), so that we can set
C0 = Ω
−a0 , C1 = Ωa1 , C2 = Ωa2 and Cz = Ωaz . Let
Bˆ := gˆ2`+4 · gˆa0 gˆa11 Dˆa21 gˆazz . Now, we can introduce the
constant g ∈ G in the equation by picking ag ← Zp since
e(Ω−1, Bˆ) = e(Ω−1 ·gag , Bˆ) ·e(g, Bˆ−ag ). Then, we finally
set Dˆ0 = Bˆ
ag , Dˆ2 = Bˆ
a3 and C3 = (Ω
−1 · gag )1/a3 for a
random a3 ← Zp.
To complete the simulated transcript, we run a paral-
lel execution of the simulators of all Σ protocols used
as subroutines. More explicitly, first pick ρ R← Zp
and m¯1, . . . , m¯`, r¯1, r¯2, wz, w0, . . . , w4, z0, z2, z3, z4
R← Zp.
Also, choose T0, T2, T3, T4
R← G and do the following:
1. Compute Eˆ1 = (Dˆ1/gˆ`+2)
−ρ · gˆ m¯12 · · · gˆ m¯``+1 ·gr¯1 and,
similarly, Eˆ2 = (Dˆ2/gˆ2`+3)
−ρ · gˆ m¯1`+3 · · · gˆ m¯`2`+2 · gr¯2 ;
2. Compute F0 = C
−ρ
0 · C r¯12 · C r¯23 · gw4 as well as
Eˆ0 = Dˆ
ρ
0 · gˆwzz · gˆw11 · Dˆw21 · Dˆw32 · gˆ−w0 ;
3. Compute Vi = T
−ρ
i ·gvifzi , for each i ∈ {0, 2, 3, 4},
and S0 = (T0/T4)
−ρ · T r¯12 · T r¯23 .
This concludes the proof.
4.3 Signing a Committed Message
At a high level, the protocol involves a committer who
wants to get a signature on m = (m1, . . . ,m`) and first
computes a commitment of the form cv = v
m1
1 · · · vm`` ·ur,
where u is the extra public parameter (with unknown
discrete log). The signer gives back elements of the form
τ1 = g
ωcsv, τ2 = g
s, τ3 = h
s which is almost the desired
signature. To get the component σ1 of the right form
relatively to τ2, τ3 the committer has to remove the factor
urs from τ1. Then, the signer also sends τ0 = u
s to enable
removing τr0 . In the protocol some randomizing steps are
included as well as other additional components allowing
the committer to extract pi, the QA-NIZK part of the
signature. In the security proof of the protocol we thus
have to show that the additional value τ0 = u
s does not
affect the unforgeability of the signature.
The protocol. At the beginning of a new run of the
protocol, the committer has a vector m = (m1, . . . ,m`),
the public-key of the signature scheme and the extra
generator u ∈ G (which can be a hashed point), the
signer also has the secret key of the signature scheme
but not m. To get a signature on m, the committer
picks r R← Zp and computes a perfectly hiding commit-
ment cv = v
m1
1 · · · vm`` ·ur ∈ G. Besides, it also computes
the elements cz = z
m1
2 · · · zm``+1 · utz . The signer receives
these commitments and they both engage in an inter-
active proof of knowledge of an equal representation of
cv relatively to the basis (v1, . . . , v`;u) and cz relatively
to the basis (z2, . . . , z`+1;u), where the signer plays the
role of the verifier. Depending on the success of the proof
the signer computes what we can call a “pre-signature”
consisting of the following group elements
τ1 = g
ω · (cv · w)s, τ3 = hs, pi0 = zω1 · csz · zs`+2,
τ2 = g
s, τ0 = u
s,
for a random s R← Zp. In the final step, the user re-
ceived the pre-signature, then picks s′ R← Zp and com-
putes (σ1, σ2, σ3, pi) ∈ G4 as follows
σ1 = τ1 · τ−r0 · (vm11 · · · vm`` · w)s
′
, σ2 = τ2 · gs
′
,
pi = pi0 · τ−tz0 · (zm12 · · · zm``+1 · z`+2)s
′
, σ3 = τ3 · hs
′
.
Finally the user checks the validity of the signature. De-
pending on the validity, the user outputs the signature
or a failure symbol ⊥.
We notice that the number of transmitted group ele-
ments is constant and no pairing is needed before the
signature verification phase. In comparison, the con-
struction of [18] requires groups of larger hidden order
and their protocol for signing committed message blocks
requires a linear number of range proofs.
Security. We briefly sketch the proof of the above proto-
col in front of malicious entities since classical arguments
can be applied. Assuming that the committer uses se-
cure ZKPK and does not output ⊥, a malicious signer
which receives perfectly hiding commitments cv, cz can-
not tell apart an honest proof from a simulated proof.
Consequently the signer learns nothing from m during
the execution of the protocol. In the other case, we have
to show that a corrupted committer remains unable to
produce valid signature on a new vector m?. First, since
the generation of u is not under the controlled of the
committer but of the random oracle, u can be made in-
dependent of rest of pk. Then, we only need to show
that the signature remains unforgeable when τ0 is given
in the signature. Since m and s can be extracted from
the proof of knowledge the reduction can output a signa-
ture on m. Moreover it is easy to see from the security
proof (in Appendix A) of the signature how this addi-
tional element can be simulated. Actually the only place
in the reduction where τ0 could not be computed directly
as us for a known s is when the challenger B has to em-
bed an SXDH challenge in a simulated signature. Given
(g, h, gb, hb+c), B can compute u = gauhbu from ran-
dom au, bu ← Zp and program the random oracle to out-
put this element u as the specification of the public-key
would do. Then to simulate τ0 B simply has to compute
τ0 = (g
b)au(hb+c)bv = ubhc·bv which is ub or random.
The rest of the reduction remains unchanged since the
value au, bu are completely independent of those already
described in the sketch of proof in Appendix A.
Remark. Since a malicious signer may know the sim-
ulation trapdoor tk = {χi}2`+4i=1 of the underlying QA-
NIZK argument, he could produce valid signature so that
logg σ2 6= logh σ3. Then, if the committer later needs to
proof knowledge of the received signature it then has to
use the sigma protocol of Section 3 where both σ2 and
σ3 only appear in committed form.
5. DYNAMIC GROUP SIGNATURES
We adapt the protocol of section 3 to build a dynamic
group signature [11, 36]. At a high level, each group
member obtains a membership certificate consisting of a
signature (σ1, σ2, σ3, pi) on a message ID ∈ Zp which is
only known to the group member. During the joining
protocol, each group member thus obtains a signature
on a committed message ID ∈ Zp. Here, we use a de-
terministic commitment to ID, which suffices to ensure
security against framing attacks and allows for a better
efficiency. When signing a message, each group member
verifiably encrypts the components (σ1, pi) of his mem-
bership certificate that depend on ID (and not σ2, σ3
which can be assumed to be honestly computed here,
unlike in the previous section). For the sake of efficiency,
we use a randomness re-using [8] variant of the Cramer-
Shoup encryption scheme [25] whereby σ1 and pi are both
encrypted using the same encryption exponent θ ∈ Zp.
For public verifiability purposes, the validity of Cramer-
Shoup ciphertexts is demonstrated using Σ protocols and
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [28] (somewhat in the fashion
of [48]) rather than designated verifier NIZK proofs [25].
In the join protocol, the user proves knowledge of his
membership secret ID ∈ Zp in a zero-knowledge manner,
which restricts the group manager to sequentially inter-
act with prospective users. However, this limitation can
be removed using an extractable commitment as in [27].
Keygen(λ,N): given λ ∈ N, and the maximum number
of users N ∈ poly(λ), choose asymmetric bilinear
groups cp = (G, Gˆ,GT , p) of order p > 2λ.
1. Generate a key pair (pks, sks) for the scheme of
section 3 for a one-block message (i.e., ` = 1). The
secret key is sks = ω, while the public key is
pks =
(
cp, g, h, gˆ, ~v = (v, w), Ω = hω, crs
)
,
where crs =
({zj}3j=1, gˆz, {gˆi}6i=1).
2. Pick xz, yz, xσ, yσ, xID, yID
R← Zp and set
Xz = g
xzhyz , Xσ = g
xσhyσ , XID = g
xIDhyID .
3. Choose a hash functionH : {0, 1}∗×G10×GT → Zp
that will be modeled as a random oracle.
4. Define Y = {pks, Xz, Xσ, XID} to be the group
public key. The group manager’s private key is
SGM = ω = sks whereas the opening authority’s pri-
vate key consists of SOA =
(
xz, yz, xσ, yσ, xID, yID
)
.
Join(GM,Ui): The group manager GM, and the prospec-
tive user Ui run the following interactive protocol:
1. Ui chooses ID R← Zp and sends the following to GM:
(VID, ZID, Gˆ2,ID, Gˆ4,ID) = (v
ID, zID2 , gˆ
ID
2 , gˆ
ID
4 )
2. GM checks that VID does not appear in any tran-
script of St and abort if it does. Otherwise (i.e., if
VID is fresh), GM verifies that: for k = 2, 4,
e(VID, gˆ)
?
= e(g, Gˆk,ID), e(ZID, gˆ)
?
= e(g, Gˆ2,ID).
If all tests pass, samples a fresh index i ∈ Zp and
sends it to Ui, otherwise abort.
3. Ui runs an interactive zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge of ID = logv(VID) in interaction with
GM. For instance, the 4-round protocol of
Cramer et al. [24] can be used for this purpose.
Let piK(ID) denote the interaction transcript.
4. GM uses VID = v
ID to sign ID using the scheme of
section 3: i.e., GM picks s R← Zp, and uses SGM = ω
to compute σ1 = g
ω · (VIDw)s = gω · (vID · w)s and
σ2 = g
s, σ3 = h
s.
Then GM uses ZID to generate the QA-NIZK proof
pi ∈ G as
pi = zω1 · (ZID · z3)s = zω1 · (zID2 · z3)s
and finally sends certi = (i, VID, σ1, σ2, σ3, pi)
5. Finally GM and Ui respectively store
transcripti=
((
ZID, Gˆ2,ID, Gˆ4,ID
)
, piK(ID), certi
)
(8)
and (certi, seci) =
(
(i, VID, σ1, σ2, σ3, pi), ID
)
.
Sign(Y, seci, certi,M): Given a messageM ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
a secret seci = ID, the user Ui does the following:
1. Re-randomize the certificate certi. Namely, choose
r R← Zp and compute σ˜2 = σ2 · gr, σ˜3 = σ3 · hr,
σ˜1 = σ1 · (vID · w)r, p˜i = pi · (zID2 · z3)r.
2. Encrypt elements p˜i, σ˜1 and v
ID from the mem-
bership certificate. Specifically, choose θ R← Zp
and compute the Cramer-Shoup ciphertext CCS =
(C1, C2, Cz, Cσ, CID), where C1 = g
θ, C2 = h
θ,
Cz = p˜i ·Xθz , Cσ = σ˜1 ·Xθσ, CID = vID ·XθID.
3. Then, prove knowledge of (ID, θ) ∈ Z2p such that
C1 = g
θ, C2 = h
θ, CID = v
ID ·XθID,(
e(Cz, gˆz) · e(Cσ, gˆ1) · e(σ˜2, gˆ3) · e(σ˜3, gˆ5)
)
=
(
e(Xz, gˆz) · e(Xσ, gˆ1)
)θ · (e(σ˜2, gˆ2) · e(σ˜3, gˆ4))−ID.
Namely, sample random rID, rθ
R← Zp, compute
R1 = g
rθ , R2 = h
rθ , R3 = v
rID ·XrθID ,
R4 =
(
e(Xz, gˆz) · e(Xσ, gˆ1)
)rθ
· (e(σ˜2, gˆ2) · e(σ˜3, gˆ4))−rID
and then c = H(M,CCS, σ˜2, σ˜3, R1, R2, R3, R4). Fi-
nally compute sθ = rθ+c ·θ, sID = rID +c · ID in Zp.
4. Return the signature Σ which consists of
Σ = (CCS, σ˜2, σ˜3, c, sID, sθ) ∈ G7 × Z3p (9)
Verify(Y,M,Σ): Parse the signature Σ as in (9) and CCS
as (C1, C2, Cz, Cσ, CID). Then, output 1 if the the
zero-knowledge proof verifies. Namely,
1. Compute the group elements R1, R2, R3 ∈ G as:
R1 = g
sθ · C−c1 , R2 = hsθ · C−c2 ,
R3 = v
sID ·XsθID · C−cID ;
(10)
and the element R4 ∈ GT as(
e(Xz, gˆz) · e(Xσ, gˆ1)
)sθ · (e(σ˜2, gˆ2) · e(σ˜3, gˆ4))−sID
· (e(Cz, gˆz) · e(Cσ, gˆ1) · e(σ˜2, gˆ3) · e(σ˜3, gˆ5))−c.
(11)
2. Return 1 if c = H(M,CCS, σ˜2, σ˜3, R1, R2, R3, R4)
and 0 otherwise.
Open(Y,SOA,M,Σ): Given a pair (M,Σ) and the OA’s
private key SOA =
(
xz, yz, xσ, yσ, xID, yID
)
:
1. Decrypt CCS = (C1, C2, Cz, Cσ, CID) by computing
σ1 = Cσ · C−xσ1 · C−yσ2 , pi = Cz · C−xz1 · C−yz2 and
VID = CID · C−xID1 C−yID2 .
2. Search VID in the database of joining transcripts (8)
and check that it corresponds to a valid signature(
σ˜1, σ˜2, σ˜3, p˜i
)
for the committed value VID. If so,
return the corresponding i, otherwise return ⊥.
It is possible to spare one group element in the sig-
nature by eliminating the encryption CID of v
ID which
is only used to open signatures in constant time. Then,
the opening algorithm has to check for each transcript if
(σ˜1, σ˜2, σ˜3, p˜i) corresponds to the identifier ID embedded
in (σ1, Gˆ2,ID, Gˆ4,ID) by testing the relation
1
?
= e(p˜i, gˆz)·e(σ˜1, gˆ1)·e(σ˜2, Gˆ2,ID·gˆ3)·e(σ˜3, Gˆ4,ID·gˆ5)·e(Ω, gˆ6).
This results in a modified opening algorithm which takes
O(N) in the worst-case. In applications where signature
openings are infrequent, this is acceptable.
5.1 Security
Theorem 3. If SXDH holds in (G, Gˆ,GT ), the
scheme is CCA-anonymous in the random oracle model.
Proof. We use a sequence of games where, for each
i, Wi is the event that the adversary A wins in Game i.
At the first transition, we need to rely on the security
of the computational soundness of the QA-NIZK argu-
ment of Section 2.2 which relies on the SXDH assump-
tion, since σ˜2 and σ˜3 appear un-encrypted in each group
signature.
Game 0: This is the real CCA-anonymity game. In
the challenge phase, the adversary outputs two
valid membership certificates and membership se-
crets (cert?0, sec
?
0), (cert
?
1, sec
?
1) and obtains a chal-
lenge signature which the challenger computes us-
ing (cert?d, sec
?
d), where d
R← {0, 1}. We define W0
to be the event that the adversary outputs d′ = d.
Game 1: This game is as Game 0, except that
the challenger B aborts in the event, which
we call F1, that A chooses membership certifi-
cates cert?0, cert
?
1 for which one of the underly-
ing signatures
(
σ?1 , σ
?
2 , σ
?
3 , pi
?
)
correctly verifies but
logg(σ
?
2) 6= logh(σ?3). This implies that the vector
(σ?1 , σ
?ID
2 , σ
?
2 , σ
?ID
3 , σ
?
3 ,Ω) is outside the row space
of the matrix M (1), so that F1 would contra-
dict the soundness of the QA-NIZK proof of [38]
(via the same arguments as in Theorem 9 of [41]
since the matrix can be witness-samplable here)
and thus the DDH assumption in Gˆ. We have
[Pr[W1]− P [W0]| ≤ AdvDDHGˆ (λ) .
Game 2: We change the way to generate the challenge
signature Σ?. Instead of faithfully running the
Schnorr-like protocol, we use the HVZK-simulator
to produce the proofs sθ, sID without knowing the
witnesses θ, ID. Namely, we pick c, sθ, sID
R← Zp
at random and set R1 = g
sθ · C−c1 , R2 = hsθ ·
C−c2 , R3 = v
sID · XsθID · C−cID as well as R4 ∈ GT
as in (11). Then, we program the random or-
acle and assign the output c to the hash value
H(M,CCS, σ˜2, σ˜3, R1, R2, R3, R4). In the unlikely
event that this value was previously defined (which
only happens with probability at most 1/p3), the
challenger aborts. Thus |Pr[W2]− Pr[W1]| ≤ 1/p3
Game 3: We modify again the generation of the chal-
lenge signature Σ?. Namely, the challenger com-
putes Cz, Cσ, CID using SOA as follows
Cz = p˜i · Cxz1 · Cyz2 ,
Cσ = σ˜ · Cxσ1 · Cyσ2 , CID = vID · CxID1 · CyID2 .
The distribution of (Cz, Cσ, CID) remains the same
and we have Pr[W3] = Pr[W2].
Game 4: Here, we modify the distribution of the chal-
lenge signature and replace C2 = h
θ by C2 = h
θ+θ′ ,
for a randomly chosen θ′ R← Zp. We prove in
Lemma 1 that |Pr[W4]− Pr[W3]| ≤ AdvDDHG (λ).
Game 5: We introduce one more change. Instead of
sampling h ∈R Zp, the challenger chooses a random
α R← Zp at the beginning of the game, sets h = gα
and retains the information α = logg(h) (note that
we are done with the DDH assumption and we can
henceforth use α = logg(h)). At each signature
opening query, the challenger returns ⊥ on any
signature Σ = (C1, C2, Cz, Cσ, CID, σ˜2, σ˜3, c, sID, sθ)
such that C2 6= Cα1 . Game 5 remains the same
as Game 4. until the event E5 that A queries
the opening of a signature that properly verifies
although C2 6= Cα1 . Lemma 2 states that Pr[E5] ≤
qO ·qH/p, where qO is the number of opening queries
and qH is the number of random oracle queries.
In Game 5, Σ? perfectly hides (p˜i, σ˜1, v
ID). Indeed,
C1 = g
θ, C2 = h
θ+θ′ , Cz = (z˜ · hθ
′·yz ) ·Xθz ,
Cσ = (σ˜1 · hθ
′·yσ ) ·Xθσ, CID = (vID · hθ
′·yID) ·XθID
and (yσ, yz, yID) ∈ Z3p are completely independent of A’s
view. The only way for A to infer information about
(yσ, yz, yID) is to make opening queries on signatures such
that C2 6= Cα1 . However, all such signatures are declared
invalid in Game 5. It comes that Pr[W5] = 1/2.
Finally, A’s advantage ∣∣Pr[W0]− 1/2∣∣ is bounded by
AdvDDHG (λ) + Adv
DDH
Gˆ (λ) +
qO · qH
p
+
1
p3
,
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 1. In Game 4, the adversary A wins the
anonymity game with negligibly different probabilities
than in Game 3 if the DDH assumption holds in G.
Proof. Let us assume that an adversary A wins with
noticeably different probabilities in Game 4 and Game 3.
We then construct a DDH distinguisher B from A.
Our reduction B takes as input a DDH instance
(ga, gb, η), where η = ga(b+c) and has to decide with non-
negligible probability ε whether c = 0 or c ∈R Zp. To
achieve this, B sets h = ga and computes the challenge
signature as C1 = g
b and C2 = η. The rest of the game
continues like in Game 3 (which is also the same as in
Game 2). If A wins and correctly guesses d′ = d ∈ {0, 1},
B outputs 1, meaning that C2 = hb = gab. Otherwise, B
returns 0 meaning that (ga, gb, η) ∈R G3.
It is easy to see that B’s advantage as a DDH distin-
guisher is ε if |Pr[W4]− Pr[W3]| = ε.
Lemma 2. In Game 5, we have Pr[E5] ≤ qO · qH/p.
Proof. This proof uses idea similar to the security
proof of the Katz-Wang [37] signature scheme. In Game
5, event E5 happens if logg(C1) 6= logh(C2) and the ver-
ification equations (10) and (11) holds. In particular, we
have R1 = g
sθ · C−c1 and R2 = hsθ · C−c2 , which can be
interpreted as a linear system with unknowns (c, sθ) ∈ Z2p{
logg(R1) = sθ − logg(C1) · c modp,
logh(R2) = sθ − logh(C2) · c modp.
(12)
We can assume w.l.o.g. that each opening query is pre-
ceded by the corresponding random oracle query (oth-
erwise, the reduction can simply make the hash query
for itself). The input of each hash query contains a pair
(R1, R2) determining the non-homogeneous terms of the
linear system (12). Since logg(C1) 6= logh(C2), the sys-
tem is full-rank, so that for each (R1, R2), there is exactly
one pair (c, sθ) ∈ Z2p that satisfies (12). The probability
that, in response to a random oracle query, the reduc-
tion returns the value of c which is uniquely determined
by (12) is at most 1/p. For all hash queries, the prob-
ability that one of them be answered with the uniquely
determined c ∈ Zq is at most qH/p. A union bound over
all opening queries implies that the probability that the
event E4 happens is smaller than Pr[E4] ≤ qO ·qH/p.
The proof of security against misidentification attacks
requires the reduction to rewind a the proof of knowl-
edge of ID at each execution of the join protocol with the
adversary attempting to escape traceability. For this rea-
son, we need to assume that users join the system sequen-
tially, rather than concurrently. However, this problem
can be solved as in [27] by having the user send an ex-
tractable commitment to ID and non-interactively prove
(via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic) that he did so correctly.
This allows the reduction to extract ID without rewind-
ing the user at each execution of Join. Then, the proof
of security against framing attacks must be modified by
having the reduction simulate the proof of knowledge of
ID (by programming a random oracle) and rely on the
hiding property of the extractable commitment.
Theorem 4. In the ROM, the scheme is secure
against mis-identification attacks under the SXDH as-
sumption in (G, Gˆ).
Proof. The proof uses the forking technique [47]
which consists in implicitly rewinding the zero-knowledge
proof by running the adversary twice and changing the
outputs of the random oracle after the hash query that
involves the forgery message. The Forking Lemma [47]
– more precisely, its generalization given by Bellare and
Neven [10] – ensures that, after two runs of the adversary,
the reduction can extract witnesses of which knowledge
is demonstrated by the signature of knowledge.
Let us assume an attacker A against the mis-
identification game that wins with non-negligible prob-
ability ε. We build an adversary B against the chosen-
message security of the signature scheme of section 3.
Keygen. At the key generation, B invokes its own chal-
lenger for the chosen-message security game to obtain
the public key pks for the signature scheme. pks is em-
bedded in the group public key Y. Except for SGM, all
keys are generated as in the normal Keygen algorithm.
Join. To answer joining queries without knowing sks,
B uses the knowledge extractor of the proof of knowl-
edge of ID = logv(VID) to extract the identity to be
signed. Namely, on a Join query, the reduction B
rewinds the adversary A in order to extract the wit-
ness ID = logv(VID) of which A demonstrates knowl-
edge at step 3 of the join protocol. Having extracted
ID ∈ Zp, B invokes its own signing oracle on the mes-
sage ID to obtain (σ1, σ2, σ3, z, r). Then, B returns
certi = (i, VID, σ1, σ2, σ3, z, r) as in a normal execution
of the join protocol.
At some point, the attacker A produces a valid forgery
(M?,Σ? = (C?1 , C
?
2 , C
?
z , C
?
σ, C
?
ID, σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , c
?, s?ID, s
?
θ)) for
which the opening algorithm does not reveal a prop-
erly registered identity. With all but negligible prob-
ability, A must have queried the random oracle value
H(M?, C?CS, σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , R
?
1, R
?
2, R
?
3, R
?
4) which would have
been unpredictable otherwise.
Thus, B replays the adversary A with the same input
and random tape as in the first run. In the second
run, the random oracle is also the same until the hash
query H(M?, C?CS, σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , R
?
1, R
?
2, R
?
3, R
?
4). At this point,
the forking occurs and B outputs fresh random oracle
values. By the Forking Lemma of [10], B obtains two
suitably related forgeries with non-negligible probability
ε·(ε/qH−1/p). Namely, B will obtain two matching tran-
scripts (C?CS, σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , c
?, s?ID, s
?
θ), (C
?
CS, σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , c
†, s†ID, s
†
θ) of
the Σ protocol for the commitment message com =
(C?CS, σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , R
?
1, R
?
2, R
?
3, R
?
4). From the responses s
?
ID and
s†ID (that necessarily involve the same identifier ID
? which
is uniquely determined by C?CS = (C
?
1 , C
?
2 , C
?
z , C
?
σ, C
?
ID)),
B runs the knowledge extractor of to obtain ID? ∈ Zp.
Namely, given (c?, c′?, s?θ , s
′?
θ , s
?
ID, s
′?
ID) ∈ Z6p with
c? 6= c†, s?θ 6= s†θ s?ID 6= s†ID
which verifies the relation (10) , (11) for the same com-
mitment (R?1, R
?
2, R
?
3, R
?
4) ∈ G4, one can compute the
secrets ID? =
s
†
ID
−s?ID
c?−c† mod p and θ
? =
s
†
θ
−s?θ
c?−c† mod p.
Finally B uses SOA to extract σ˜?1 , r˜?, z˜? and outputs(
ID?, σ? = (σ˜?1 , σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , r˜
?, z˜?)
)
as a forgery for the sig-
nature scheme of Section 3.
Theorem 5. In the ROM, the scheme is secure
against framing attacks under the SDL assumption
Proof. Let us assume that a PPT adversary A can
create, with advantage ε, a forgery (M?, σ?) that opens
to some honest user i ∈ Ub who did not sign M?. We
give a reduction B that uses A to break SDL.
Algorithm B takes as input an SDL instance
(g, gˆ, ga, gˆa) and uses its interaction with the adversary
A to compute a ∈ Zp. To generate the group public
key Y, B runs all the steps of the real setup algorithm
Keygen except step 1. At step 1, B defines the gener-
ators g, gˆ in pks to be those of its input and computes
h = gαh , v = gαv , w = gαw , gˆz = gˆ
αz for randomly
chosen scalars αh, αv, αw, αz
R← Zp. In order to compute
{zj}3j=1 of crs contained in pks, B chooses tk = {χj}6j=1
of step 4 of the key generation algorithm of the signa-
ture scheme of Section 3 with ` = 1. (Note that when
` = 1, n = 6 and that {zj}3j=1 are QA-NIZK argu-
ment for the vectors (g, 1, 1, 1, 1, h), (v, g, 1, h, 1, 1) and
(w, 1, g, 1, h, 1). Moreover {gˆi = gˆχiz }6i=1 are the veri-
fying key.) As a result of this setup phase, B knows
SGM = sks = ω, SOA =
(
xz, yz, xσ, yσ, xID, yID
)
and even
tk. The adversary A is run on input of the group pub-
lic key Y := (pks, (Xz, Xσ, XID), H), which has the same
distribution as in the real attack game.
Should A decide to corrupt the group manager or the
opening authority during the game, B is able to reveal
SGM = sks and SOA when requested. In addition, B must
be able to answer the following queries.
- Qb-join-queries: At any time A can act as a cor-
rupted group manager and introduce a new hon-
est user i in the group by invoking the Qb-join or-
acle. Then, B runs Juser on behalf of the honest
user in an execution of Join. At step 1 of Join,
B picks a random δi R← Zp and uses tk to com-
pute the tuple (Vi, Zi, Gˆ2,i, Gˆ4,i), for an unknown
seci = IDi = a · δi ∈ Zp, that JGM expects at step
1 of the join protocol. Namely, B computes the
vector ~vi = (Vi, Gi, 1, Hi, 1, 1) = (v, g, 1, h, 1, 1)
IDi
as
Vi = (g
a)αv·δi , Gi = (g
a)δi , Hi = (g
a)αh·δi ,
and then computes Zi as a simulated QA-NIZK
proof for ~vi ∈ G6 using tk. A straightforward cal-
culation shows that Zi = z
IDi
2 since the QA-NIZK
argument of Section 2.2 has a deterministic prov-
ing algorithm, so that (Vi, Zi, Gˆ2,i, Gˆ4,i) success-
fully passes the test of step 2. As for the last two
components, for each j ∈ {2, 4}, B computes
Gˆj,i := (gˆ
a)δi(αzχj+αrγj) = (gˆ
χj
z gˆ
γj
r )
IDi = gˆIDij ,
At step 3 of Join, B simulates the interactive proof
of knowledge of IDi = logv(Vi) using the simula-
tor. In the rest of the protocol, B proceeds like the
actual run and obtains certi = (i, Vi, σ1, σ2, σ3, pi).
Finally, B stores (certi, Zi, δi, Gˆ2,i, Gˆ4,i).
- Qsig-queries: When A requests user i ∈ Ub to sign
a message M , B is able to use the membership cer-
tificate certi = (i, Vi, σ1, σ2, σ3, pi) to compute the
ciphertext CCS at steps 1-2 of the signing algorithm.
While B does not know the witness IDi = a·δi ∈ Zp
to generate a proof at step 3, B is able to simulate
the non-interactive proof (c, sID, sθ), for a randomly
chosen challenge c R← Zp by programming the ran-
dom oracle. More precisely, B re-randomizes the
certificate certi by picking r
R← Zp and computing
σ˜1 = σ1 · (Vi · w)r σ˜2 = σ2 · gr,
p˜i = pi · (Zi · z3)r, σ˜3 = σ3 · hr.
Then B encrypts p˜i, σ˜1 and Vi as in the real sign-
ing algorithm to get CCS = (C1, C2, Cz, Cσ, CID).
Then, B chooses c, sID, sθ ∈ Zp and computes
R1, R2, R3, R4 as in (10) and (11) of Verify. Fi-
nally, B programs H to return c on inputs
(M,CCS, σ˜2, σ˜3, R1, R2, R3, R4). In the event that
H is already defined at that point, B aborts. The
probability to fail at one signing query is ≤ qs/p3,
where qs is the number of signing queries.
When A halts, it presumably frames some honest user
i? ∈ Ub by outputting a signature
Σ? = (C?1 , C
?
2 , C
?
z , C
?
σ, C
?
ID, σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , c
?, s?ID, s
?
θ),
for some message M?, that opens to i? ∈ Ub
although user i? did not sign M?. With high
probability, A must have queried the hash value
H(M?, C?CS, σ˜
?
2 , σ˜
?
3 , R
?
1, R
?
2, R
?
3, R
?
4), which would be un-
predictable otherwise. Hence, B can run A a second
time with the same input and random tape. At the mo-
ment when A queries H(M?, C?CS, σ˜?2 , σ˜?3 , R?1, R?2, R?3, R?4)
in the second run, B starts responding with different ran-
dom oracle values which depart from those of the ini-
tial run. The Forking Lemma of [10] ensures that, with
non-negligible probability the second run will result in
a forgery Σ† = (C?1 , C
?
2 , C
?
z , C
?
σ, C
?
ID, σ˜
†
2, σ˜
†
3, c
†, s†ID, s
†
θ) on
the same message M?, with distinct challenges c† 6= c?.
From the two responses (s?ID, s
?
θ), (s
†
ID, s
†
θ), B can extract
witnesses (θ?, ID?) satisfying C?ID = v
ID?Xθ
?
ID and which
identifies V ?i = v
ID? . At this stage, B can compute and
output the sought-after SDL solution a := ID?/δi in Zp.
This observation tells us that, if A has advantage ε as
a framing adversary making qH random oracle queries,
then B implies an algorithm solving the SDL problem
with probability ε(ε/qH − 1/p).
We stress that the proofs can be easily adapted to the
case where the opening algorithm has linear complexity
in the number of users.
5.2 Comparison with Existing Schemes
Table 1 compares our scheme with previous practical
group signatures based on pairing-related assumptions.
Since we focus on practical schemes, we only consider
those in the random oracle model. To make the com-
parison possible, we use 256-bit group orders, so that
elements of G and Zp are encoded using 256 bits each.
The scheme of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [14] is
the first scheme providing short signatures: each signa-
ture is comprised of 3 group elements and 6 elements of
Zp. However, this scheme is designed for static groups
only and relies on the Strong Diffie-Hellmann assump-
tion, which is a non-standard q-type assumption, and its
anonymity is only proved in the CPA sense.
Delerable´e and Pointcheval [27] presented a scheme
designed for a dynamically growing group and which is
also fully (i.e., CCA) anonymous. The security of their
scheme is based on the eXternal Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion (XDH), which we also use here, and the q-SDH as-
sumption. In [27], each signature consists of 4 group
elements and 5 scalars in Zp, which leads to the same
signature size as previously. They also proposed a vari-
ant to get rid of the XDH assumption at the cost of 2
more group elements and one more scalar, but they still
rely on the q-SDH assumption.
Bichsel et al. [12] proposed a very short group signa-
ture for dynamic groups, where each signature consists
of 3 group elements and 2 elements in Zp. The downsides
are their use the LRSW assumption [42], which is a very
ad-hoc interactive assumption, and their security notion
is not fully-anonymous, but is an hybrid security with
selfless-anonymity, which is marked “CCA-” in Table 1.
Another caveat is that, unlike the two previous systems,
the opening complexity of their scheme is linear in the
number of group members.
In 2015, Pointcheval and Sanders [46] gave another
instantiation of [12] based on a variant of the LRSW as-
sumption in the asymmetric setting (meaning using only
Type III pairings), which provides even shorter signa-
tures than [12] with the same downsides. Their scheme
Name Signature length Assumptions Group Type Anonymity
G Zp bits
Ours 7 3 2560 bits SXDH + SDL Dynamic CCA
Boneh-Boyen-Shacham 3 6 2304 bits SDH + DLIN Static CPA
Delerable´e-Pointcheval 4 5 2304 bits SDH + XDH Dynamic CCA
Bichsel et al. 3 2 1280 bits LRSW + SDL Dynamic CCA-
Pointcheval-Sanders 2 2 1024 bits LRSW Dynamic CCA-
Table 1: Comparison between different group signature schemes
provides signatures composed of only 2 group elements
in G and 2 scalars in Zp.
Our main contribution compared to these schemes is to
provide size-comparable signatures – we recall that our
scheme is composed of 7 group elements and 3 scalars
in Zp – while relying on standard, constant-size assump-
tions. Moreover, we can notice that we can save one
element in G at the expense of a linear-time opening al-
gorithm in the number N of group users (like [12]).
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. We will proceed as in [41] to prove that the
scheme of section 3 is secure under chosen-message at-
tacks. Namely we will consider a sequence of hybrid
games involving two kinds of signatures.
Type A signatures: These are real signatures:
σ1 = g
ω · (vm11 · · · vm`` · w)s, σ2 = gs,
pi = zω1 · (zm12 · · · zm``+1 · z`+2)s, σ3 = hs.
(13)
Since (σ1, σ
m1
2 , . . . , σ
m`
2 , σ2, σ
m1
3 , . . . , σ
m`
3 , σ3,Ω) is
in the row space of M, the QA-NIZK proof pi has
the same distribution as if it were computed as
pi = σ−χ11 ·
(
`+1∏
i=2
σ
−χimi−1
2
)
· σ−χ`+22 ·(
2`+2∏
i=`+3
σ
−χimi−`−2
3
)
· σ−χ2`+33 · Ω−χ2`+4 .
(14)
We also define Type A′ signatures as a generalization of
Type A signatures where only condition (13) are imposed
and no restriction is given on pi beyond the fact that it
should be a valid homomorphic signature on vector (2).
Type B signatures: These use a random value ω′ ∈R
Zp instead of the secret key ω. We pick random
ω′, s, s1
R← Zp and compute:
(σ1, σ2, σ3) = (g
ω′ · (vm11 · · · vm`` · w)s, gs, hs+s1),
The QA-NIZK proof pi is computed as in (14) by
using tk = {χi}2`+4i=1 . Note that Type B signatures
can be generated without using ω ∈ Zp.
We consider a sequence of games. In Game i, Si de-
notes the event that A produces a valid signature σ? on
M? such that (M?, σ?) was not queried before, and by
Ei the event that A produces a Type A′ signature.
Game 0: This is the real game. The challenger B pro-
duces a key pair (sk, pk) and sends pk to A. Then
A makes Q signature queries: A sends messages Mi
to B, and B answers by sending σi = Sign(sk,Mi) to
A. Finally A sends a pair (M?, σ?) /∈ {(Mi, σi)}Qi=1
and wins if Verify(pk, σ?,M?) = 1.
Game 1: We change the way B answers signing queries.
The QA-NIZK proofs pi are then computed as sim-
ulated QA-NIZK proofs using tk as in (14). These
QA-NIZK proofs are thus simulated proofs for true
statements, and then their distribution remains un-
changed. We have Pr[S1] = Pr[S1 ∧ E1] + Pr[S1 ∧
¬E1]. Lemma 3 states that the event S1 ∧ ¬E1
happens with all but negligible probability: Pr[S1∧
¬E1] ≤ AdvDDHGˆ (λ)− 1/p. Thus our task is now to
upper-bound the probability Pr[S1 ∧ E1].
Game 2.k (0 ≤ k ≤ Q): In Game 2.k, the challenger
returns a Type B signature for the first k queries.
At the last Q − k signature queries, the challenger
answers a type A signature. Lemma 4 ensures that∣∣Pr[S2.k ∧ E2.k]− Pr[S2.(k−1) ∧ E2.(k−1)]∣∣ is smaller
than AdvDDHG (λ) + 1/p.
In Game 2.Q, we know that if SXDH holds, A can only
output a type A′ forgery even if it only obtains type
B signatures during the game. Nevertheless, lemma 5
shows that a type A′ forgery in Game 2.Q contradicts
the DDH assumptions in G. Therefore we have Pr[S2.Q∧
E2.Q] ≤ AdvDDHG (λ). Putting the above altogether, the
probability Pr[S0] is upper-bounded by
AdvDDHGˆ (λ)+
1
p
+Q
(
AdvDDHG (λ) +
1
p
)
+AdvDDHG (λ)
< (Q+ 2) ·
(
AdvSXDHG,Gˆ (λ) +
1
p
)
.
Lemma 3. In Game 1, if the DDH assumption holds
in Gˆ, A can only output a type A′ forgery.
Proof. Let A be an attacker that does not output
a type A′ forgery. We will build an attacker B against
the soundness of the Quasi-Adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK)
scheme, which security is implied from the double-pairing
problem that reduces from DDH as explained in [39]. Let
us define the vector σ ∈ G2`+4 as
(σ?1 , σ
?m1
2 , . . . , σ
?m`
2 , σ
?
2 , σ
?m1
3 , . . . , σ
?m`
3 , σ
?
3 ,Ω) ∈ G2`+4.
If (M?, σ?) is not a type A′ forgery, σ is then not in the
row space of M.
Our reduction B receives as input cp = (G, Gˆ,GT , p),
a matrix M as in (1) and a common reference string
crs (depending on the matrix) for an instance of the QA-
NIZK scheme allowing to prove that vectors of dimension
2`+ 4 are in the row space of M. The generation of the
matrix M fixes g, h and ~v = (v1, . . . , v`, w) ∈ G`+1. After
that, B picks ω R← Zp and gˆ R← Gˆ, and set Ω = hω. Then,
the reduction B sends to A cp and the verification key:
pk =
(
g, h, gˆ, ~v, ω, crs
)
.
Since B knows the secret key ω ∈ Zp, it can answer all
signing queries by honestly running the Sign algorithm,
in particular, it does not need to know tk to do this.
When A halts, it outputs (M?, σ?) where σ? is not a
Type A′ forgery, so that σ is not in the row space of
M. Therefore, outputting pi? constitutes a valid proof
against the soundness property of the scheme, and thus
implies an algorithm against DDH as in [38] since the
matrix can be witness-samplable.
Lemma 4. If DDH holds in G, for each k ∈
{1, . . . , Q}, A produces a type A′ forgery with negli-
gibly different probabilities in Game 2.k and Game
2.(k − 1).
Proof. Let us assume there exists an index k ∈
{1, . . . , Q} and an adversary A that outputs a Type A′
forgery with smaller probability in Game 2.k than in
Game 2.(k − 1). We build a DDH distinguisher B.
Algorithm B takes in (ga, gb, η) ∈ G3, where η = ga(b+c),
and decides if c = 0 or c ∈R Zp. To do this, B sets
h = ga. It picks ω, av1 , bv1 , . . . , av` , bv` , aw, bw
R← Zp and
sets Ω = hω as well as:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `} : vi = gavi · hbvi , w = gaw · hbw .
The reduction B also chooses tk = {χi}2`+4i=1 and com-
putes crs = ({zj}2`+4j=1 , gˆz, {gˆi}2`+4i=1 ) as in steps 3-4 of Key-
gen. It then outputs pk = (g, h, gˆ, ~v, ω, crs).
Then, queries are answered depending on their index j:
Case j < k: B computes a Type B signature, σ =
(σ1, σ2, σ3, pi), using tk = {χi}2`+4i=1 with the QA-NIZK
simulator to computes pi.
Case j > k: The last Q − k − 1 signing queries are
computed as Type A signatures, which B is able to gen-
erate using the secret key ω ∈ Zp he knows and crs or
tk = {χi}2`+4i=1 to produces valid proofs.
Case j = k: In the k-th signing query (m1, . . . ,m`),
B embeds the DDH instance in the signature and sim-
ulates either Game 2.k or Game 2.(k − 1) depending
on whether η = gab or η = ga(b+c) for some c ∈R
Zp. Namely, B computes σ2 = gb, σ3 = η, and
σ1 = g
ωσ
aw+
∑`
i=1 avimi
2 σ
bw+
∑`
i=1 bvimi
3 . Then B simu-
lates QA-NIZK proofs pi as recalled in (14), and sends
σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, pi) to A.
If η = gab, the k-th signature σ is a Type A signature
with s = b. If η = ga(b+c) for some c ∈R Zp, we have:
σ1 = g
ωgac·(bw+
∑`
i=1 bvimi)(vm11 · · · vm`` w)b
= gω
′
(vm11 · · · vm`` w)b
σ2 = g
b, σ3 = h
b+c
Where ω′ = ω + ac · (bw +∑`i=1 bvimi). Since the term
bw+
∑`
i=1 bvimi is uniform and independent of A’s view,
σ is distributed as a Type B signature if η = ga(b+c).
When A terminates, it outputs a couple
(m?1 · · ·m?` , σ?) that has not been queried during
the signing queries. Now the reduction B has to deter-
mine whether σ? is a Type A′ forgery or not. To this
end, it tests if the equality:
σ?1 = g
ωσ
?aw+
∑`
i=1 avim
?
i
2 σ
?bw+
∑`
i=1 bvim
?
i
3 (15)
is satisfied. If it is, B outputs 1 to indicate that η = gab.
Otherwise it outputs 0 and rather bets that η ∈R G.
To see why this test allows recognizing Type A′ forg-
eries, we remark that σ? is of the form:
σ?2 = g
s, σ?3 = h
s+s1 , σ?1 = g
ω+s0(v
m?1
1 · · · vm
?
`
` w)
s,
and the goal of B is to decide whether (s0, s1) = (0, 0) or
not. We notice that s0 = a · s1 · (bw +∑`i=1 bvi ·m?i ) if
the forgery fulfills relation (15) and we show this to only
happen with probability 1/p for any s1 6= 0 meaning that
Type B forgery passes the test with the same probability.
From the entire game and assuming a forgery which
passes the test we have the following linear system:

I`+1 a · I`+1
0>`+1 ac · (m1| · · · |m`|1)
0>`+1 as1 · (m?1| · · · |m?` |1)
 ·

av1
...
av`
aw
bv1
...
bv`
bw

=

logg(v1)
...
logg(v`)
logg(w)
ω′ − ω
s0

where, 0`+1 denotes the zero vector of length ` + 1
and m1, . . . ,m` is the message involved in the k-th
signing query. Note that the (l + 2)-th equation is
meaningless when c = 0 since then ω′ = ω. How-
ever, even if c 6= 0 the information that A can infer
about (av1 , . . . , av` , aw, bv1 , . . . , bv` , bw) ∈ Z2`+2p during
the game amounts to the first `+ 2 equations of the sys-
tem which is of full rank. It means that this vector is
unpredictable since all the solutions of this linear system
live in a sub-space of dimension at least one (actually
` = (2` + 2) − (` + 2)). Finally, as long as s1 6= 0, the
right value s0 can only be guessed with probability 1/p
since the last row of the matrix is independent of the
others as soon as (m1, . . . ,m`) 6= (m?1, . . . ,m?` ) 6= 0.
To conclude the proof, since B is able the tell apart the
type of the forgery, if A’s probability to output a forgery
of some Type in Game k−1 (i.e. c = 0) was significantly
different than in Game k (i.e. c 6= 0) then B would be
able to solve the DDH problem with non-negligible.
Lemma 5. In Game 2.Q, a PPT adversary out-
putting a type A′ forgery would contradict the DDH as-
sumption in G: Pr[S2.Q ∧ E2.Q] ≤ AdvDDHG (λ) .
Proof. We will build an algorithm B for solving the
Computational Diffie Hellman problem (CDH) which is
at least as hard as the DDH problem. The reduction
B takes as input a tuple (g, h,Ω = hω) and computes
gω. To generate pk, B picks gˆ R← Gˆ, av1 , . . . , av` , aw R←
Zp and computes v1 = gav1 , . . . , v` = gav` , and
w = gaw . Then B generates tk = {χi}2`+4i=1 , crs =
({zj}`+2j=1, gˆz, {gˆi}2`+4i=1 ) as in step 3-4 of the key generation
algorithm, then sends the public key pk =
(
g, h, gˆ,v,Ω =
hω, crs
)
to A.
B also retains tk = {χi}2`+4i=1 to handle signing queries.
We recall that during the game, signing queries are an-
swered by returning a Type B signature so that, us-
ing tk, B can answer all queries without knowing the
ω = logh(Ω) which is part of the CDH challenge.
The results of Lemma 4 implies that even if A only
obtains Type B signatures, it will necessarily output a
Type A′ forgery σ? = (σ?1 , σ
?
2 , σ
?
3 , pi
?) unless the DDH
assumption does not hold in G. This event thus allows B
to compute gω = σ?1 · σ?−aw−
∑`
i=1 avim
?
i
2 , which contra-
dicts the DDH assumption in G.
B. DEFINITIONS FOR DYNAMIC
GROUP SIGNATURES
In the setting of dynamic groups, the syntax of group
signatures includes an interactive protocol which allows
users to register as new members of the group at any
time. The syntax and the security model are those de-
fined by Kiayias and Yung (KY) [36]. Like the very simi-
lar Bellare-Shi-Zhang model [11], the KY model assumes
an interactive join protocol whereby a prospective user
becomes a group member by interacting with the group
manager. This protocol provides the user with a mem-
bership certificate and a membership secret.
We denote by N ∈ poly(λ) the maximal number of
group members. A dynamic group signature scheme con-
sists of the following algorithms or protocols.
Setup: given a security parameter λ and a maximal num-
ber of group members N ∈ N, this algorithm is run
by a trusted party to generate a group public key
Y, the group manager’s private key SGM and the
opening authority’s private key SOA. Each key is
given to the appropriate authority while Y is made
public. The algorithm also initializes a public state
St comprising a set data structure Stusers = ∅ and a
string data structure Sttrans = .
Join: is an interactive protocol between the group man-
ager GM and a user Ui where the latter becomes
a group member. The protocol involves two in-
teractive Turing machines Juser and JGM that both
take Y as input. The execution, denoted as
[Juser(λ,Y), JGM(λ, St,Y,SGM)], ends with user Ui
obtaining a membership secret seci, that no one else
knows, and a membership certificate certi. If the
protocol is successful, the group manager updates
the public state St by setting Stusers := Stusers ∪ {i}
as well as Sttrans := Sttrans||〈i, transcripti〉.
Sign: given a membership certificate certi, a membership
secret seci, a message M , it outputs a signature σ.
Verify: given a signature σ, a message M and a group
public key Y, this algorithm returns either 0 or 1.
Open: takes as input a message M , a valid signature σ
w.r.t. Y , the opening authority’s private key SOA
and the public state St. It outputs i ∈ Stusers∪{⊥},
which is the identity of a group member or a symbol
indicating an opening failure.
Each membership certificate contains a unique tag that
identifies the user.
Correctness for Dynamic Group Signatures. Fol-
lowing the terminology of [36], a public state St is valid
if it can be reached from St = (∅, ) by a Turing machine
having oracle access to JGM. Also, a state St
′ is said to
extend another state St if it is within reach from St.
As in [36], certi Y seci, means that there
exists coin tosses $ for JGM and Juser such that,
for some valid public state St′, the execution of
[Juser(λ,Y), JGM(λ, St′,Y,SGM)]($) provides Juser with
〈i, seci, certi〉.
Definition 4. A dynamic group signature scheme is
correct if the following conditions are all satisfied:
1. In a valid state St, |Stusers| = |Sttrans| always holds
and two distinct entries of Sttrans always contain cer-
tificates with distinct tag.
2. If [Juser(λ,Y), JGM(λ, St,Y,SGM)] is run by two hon-
est parties following the protocol and 〈i, certi, seci〉
is obtained by Juser, then it holds that certi Y seci.
3. For each 〈i, certi, seci〉 such that certi Y seci,
satisfying condition 2, it always holds that
Verify
(
Sign(Y, certi, seci,M),M,Y
)
= 1.
4. For any outcome 〈i, certi, seci〉 of the in-
teraction [Juser(., .), JGM(., St, ., .)] for some
valid St, if σ = Sign(Y, certi, seci,M), then
Open(M,σ,SOA,Y, St′) = i.
The Kiayias-Yung model [36] considers three security
notions: security against mis-identification attacks, non
frameability and (full) anonymity. These notions are for-
malized through experiments where the adversary inter-
acts with a stateful interface I that maintains the fol-
lowing variables:
• stateI : is a data structure representing the state
of the interface as the adversary invokes the ora-
cles available in the attack games. It is initialized
as stateI = (St,Y,SGM,SOA) ← Setup(λ,N). It in-
cludes the (initially empty) set Stusers of group mem-
bers and a database Sttrans storing the transcripts of
previously executed join protocols.
• n = |Stusers| < N is the current group cardinality.
• Sigs: is a database of signatures created by the sign-
ing oracle. Each entry consists of a triple (i,M, σ)
indicating that message M was signed by user i.
• Ua: is the set of users that were introduced by the
adversary in the system in an execution of Join.
• Ub: is the set of honest users that the adversary
introduces, acting as a dishonest group manager.
When mounting attacks, adversaries will be granted
access to the following oracles.
• Qpub, QkeyGM and QkeyOA: when these oracles are in-
voked, the interface looks up stateI and returns the
group public key Y, the GM’s private key SGM and
the opening authority’s private key SOA respectively.
• Qa-join: allows the adversary A to introduce users
under his control in the group. On behalf of the
GM, the interface runs JGM in interaction with
the Juser-executing adversary who plays the role
of the prospective user in the join protocol. If
this protocol successfully ends, the interface incre-
ments n, updates St by inserting the new user n
in both sets Stusers and U
a. It also sets Sttrans :=
Sttrans||〈n, transcriptn〉.
• Qb-join: allows A, acting as a corrupted group man-
ager, to introduce new honest group members. The
interface triggers an execution of [Juser, JGM] and runs
Juser in interaction with A who runs JGM. If the
protocol successfully completes, the interface incre-
ments n, adds user n to Stusers and U
b and sets
Sttrans := Sttrans||〈n, transcriptn〉. It stores the mem-
bership certificate certn and the membership secret
secn in a private part of stateI .
• Qsig: given M , an index i, the interface checks if the
private area of stateI contains a certificate certi and
a membership secret seci. If no such (certi, seci) ex-
ist or if i 6∈ Ub, the interface returns ⊥. Otherwise,
it outputs a signature σ on behalf of user i and also
updates Sigs := Sigs||(i,M, σ).
• Qopen: when this oracle is invoked on input of a valid
pair (M,σ), the interface runs algorithm Open using
the current state St. When S is a set of pairs of the
form (M,σ), Q¬Sopen denotes a restricted oracle that
only applies the opening algorithm to pairs (M,σ)
which are not in the set S.
• Qread and Qwrite: are used by A to read/write the
content of stateI . At each invocation, Qread outputs
the whole stateI but the public/private keys and the
private part of stateI where membership secrets are
stored after Qb-join-queries. By using Qwrite, A can
modify stateI at will as long as it does not remove
or alter elements of Stusers, Sttrans or invalidate the
public state St: for example, A is allowed to cre-
ate dummy users as long as he/she does not re-use
already existing certificate tags.
Security Against Mis-identification Attacks. In a
mis-identification attack, the adversary is able to corrupt
the opening authority using the QkeyOA oracle. Moreover,
he can also introduce malicious users in the group via
Qa-join-queries. His purpose is to come up with a valid
signature σ? that does not open to any adversarially-
controlled user.
Definition 5. A dynamic group signature scheme is se-
cure against mis-identification attacks if, for any PPT
adversary A involved in the experiment hereunder, we
have Advmis-idA (λ) = Pr
[
Expmis-idA (λ) = 1
] ∈ negl(λ).
Experiment Expmis-idA (λ)
1. stateI = (St,Y,SGM,SOA)← Setup(λ,N);
2. (M?, σ?)← A(Qpub, Qa-join, Qrevoke, Qread, QkeyOA);
3. If Verify(σ?,M?,Y) = 0, return 0;
4. i = Open(M?, σ?,SOA,Y, St′);
5. If i 6∈ Ua return 1; Otherwise return 0;
Non-Frameability. In framing attacks, the entire sys-
tem is colluding against some honest user. The adversary
can corrupt the group manager as well as the opening
authority (via oracles QkeyGM and QkeyOA, respectively).
He can also introduce honest group members (via Qb-join-
queries), observe the system while these users sign mes-
sages and create dummy users using Qwrite. The adver-
sary eventually aims at framing an honest group member.
Definition 6. A dynamic group signature scheme is
secure against framing attacks if, for any PPT adver-
sary A involved in the experiment below, it holds that
AdvfraA (λ) = Pr
[
ExpfraA (λ) = 1
] ∈ negl(λ).
Experiment ExpfraA (λ)
1. stateI = (St,Y,SGM,SOA)← Setup(λ,N);
2. (M?, σ?)←
A(Qpub, QkeyGM, QkeyOA, Qb-join, Qsig, Qread, Qwrite);
3. If Verify(σ?,M?,Y) = 0, return 0;
4. If i = Open(M?, σ?,SOA,Y, St′) 6∈ Ub, return 0;
5. If
(∧
j∈Ub s.t. j=i (j,M
?, ∗) 6∈ Sigs) return 1;
6. Return 0;
Full Anonymity. Anonymity is formalized via a game
involving a two-stage adversary. The first stage allows
the adversary A to modify stateI via Qwrite-queries and
open arbitrary signatures by probing Qopen. Then, A
chooses a message M? as well as two pairs (sec?0, cert
?
0)
and (sec?1, cert
?
1), consisting of a valid membership certifi-
cate and a corresponding membership secret. The chal-
lenger flips a coin d ← {0, 1} and computes a challenge
signature σ? using (sec?d, cert
?
d), which is given σ
? to A
who is allowed further oracle queries throughout the sec-
ond stage, but is restricted not to query Qopen for the
challenge message-signature pair (M?, σ?).
Definition 7. A dynamic group signature scheme
is fully anonymous if, for any PPT adversary A,
AdvanonA (λ) := |Pr [ ExpanonA (λ) = 1]− 1/2| ∈ negl(λ).
Experiment ExpanonA (λ)
1. stateI = (St,Y,SGM,SOA)← Setup(λ);
2.
(
aux,M?, (sec?0, cert
?
0), (sec
?
1, cert
?
1)
)
← A(play; Qpub, QkeyGM, Qopen, Qread, Qwrite);
3. If ¬(cert?b Y sec?b) for b ∈ {0, 1}, return 0;
4. If cert?0 = cert
?
1, return 0;
5. Picks random d← {0, 1};
σ? ← Sign(Y, cert?d, sec?d,M?);
6. d′ ← A(guess; σ?, aux,Qpub, QkeyGM,
Q
¬{(M?,σ?)}
open , Qread, Qwrite);
7. If d′ = d then return 1;
8. Return 0;
